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Debates about the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 have pointed at institutional and 
individual-behavioural factors as its causes. Using the British Household Panel Survey, this 
paper highlights marked differences in perceptions of societal and economic fairness among 
financial services employees in investment or management positions in the UK, and the 
general working population at the brink of the GFC. Panel data analysis suggests that financial 
services and occupations did not necessarily attract employees with pro-market attitudes, but 
that employment in these institutions and occupations made it more likely that employees 
came to display these perceptions, contributing to the construction of a distinct attitudinal 
profile of finance employees.  
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The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that started in 2007 triggered a very public soul-searching in 
Europe and the USA as to who may need to bear responsibility for the manifest economic and 
fiscal calamities brought about by a collapsing and bailed-out banking sector. Early culprits 
included the banking institutions themselves, including mainstream banks and their highly 
paid chief executives, but also hedge funds and other shadow banking operators. For some, 
the GFC came about as a result of lack of oversight or due diligence, loose monetary policy 
especially in the United States, and irresponsible lending practices (Cassidy 2009). For others, 
the root cause was the financialisation of economies that helped to spread these lending 
practices worldwide (Freeman 2010); unsustainable and irresponsible credit-seeking by, and 
lending to, increasingly indebted private consumers (Hamnett 2009); the erosion of faith in 
debt-driven national economies (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009); excessive incentives and the 
rent-seeking behaviour of financial elites (Hodgson et al. 2010); or indeed flawed economic 
theories (UN 2009). This list is not exhaustive, and none of the above interpretations are 
necessarily mutually exclusive. As of late, however, the public discourse has settled for 
blaming the public and, notably, the public sector of countries affected by the GFC, many of 
which had only just rescued the private banking sector from collapse (Blyth 2014). 
The puzzle remains as to whether institutions or individuals and their reckless 
behaviour brought down the global economy so soon after the last crisis of the ‘dot-com’ 
industry in 2001. Typically, explorations of the role of individuals in economic crises have 
focussed on top-level ‘wheelers-and-dealers’, on the power and influence of the super-rich 
(Armstrong 2010), those who mistakenly thought they were geniuses (Lowenstein 2002) or 
the ‘smartest guys in the room’ (McLean & Elkind 2004) that could set no foot wrong; and on 
the ‘rogue’ elements in the sector.  
This paper widens the net to take a look at the attitudes towards social and economic 
issues prevalent among ‘average’ bankers and financial executives in the UK in the years 
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leading up to the GFC. Drawing on longitudinal survey data, the paper analyses social 
preferences and perceptions of people working in financial occupations in the UK and 
compares them to other populations. Collectively, those working in financial occupations will 
be referred to as ‘financial services employees’, or FSE. 
Specifically, the paper examines, first, the extent to which social perceptions and 
attitudes among the UK’s FSE at the start of the crisis differed from those of the British 
population at large. The analysis seeks to shed a little more light on the validity of ‘blaming’ 
excessive risk-taking and ‘greed’ for the GFC: were FSE’s attitudes towards risk, money, or 
economic principles really that different from the rest of the working population to warrant 
singling out the former as possible perpetrators of crisis-inducing behaviour? 
Second, the study exploits the availability of longitudinal survey data to test the 
association between social perceptions on the one hand, and job duration, that is, extended 
exposure to working in financial services occupations, on the other. Specifically, this will allow 
some judgement as to whether working in finance amplifies social orientations in ways not 
observed among other populations. The analysis will also ask whether financial services 
occupations attract employees with social orientation that are already different from those of 
the working population at large. In other words, if we were to find distinct or distinctly 
prominent social attitudes among FSE, is that because people with such social perceptions 
self-select into financial services occupations or because working in these occupations leads 
FSE to acquire such perceptions? 
Empirically confirming one or both effects has significant implications for our 
understanding and ability of explain the GFC in terms of individualised-behavioural or 
structural, institutional models. In the following section, key features of these two models are 
reviewed, before turning to presenting, first, the data and, then, the analysis and its findings.   
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Overview of the literature 
This section is divided into two parts, commencing with a review of the literature purporting 
‘individualistic’ interpretations of the crisis, which is followed by a review of the corporate-
institutional interpretations of the origins of the GFC. 
Individual-behavioural theories of the crisis in the making 
Individual-behavioural theories of the crisis have a strong focus on the actions of investment 
bankers and working in top-level managerial positions in financial institutions. References are 
made to the evident misdemeanour of so-called rogue traders, including, to name but a few, 
Société Generale’s Jerome Kerviel who was convicted of defrauding his employer and clients 
in the run up to the GFC, and UBS’s Kweku Adoboli whose fraudulent trading behaviour was 
detected in the early years of the GFC.  
Whereas these and other rogue traders were largely acting on their own (or teaming 
up in twos), banking corporations have allowed more systematic and systemic fraudulent 
manipulations of the financial system to be committed, as in the case affecting the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Here bankers and traders of some of the world’s largest 
financial institutions colluded in rigging interest rates at which the banks would lend to each 
other, to their collective benefit and that of their derivative traders (Hou & Skeie 2014, H.M. 
Treasury 2012). 
Martin Lewis’s ‘Liar’s Poker’ (1989), ‘The Big Short’ (2010) and ‘Boomerang’ (2011) are 
awash with examples of reckless and self-centred rent-seeking behaviours in financial 
investment circles. Similar stories were recounted by Lowenstein (2002) and McLean and 
Elkind (2004) in their studies of the rises and falls of the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital 
Management, and the energy giant, Enron in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Case studies like 
these share one story line, namely the sidelining and derision of risk managers and whistle-
blowers whose concerns and words of caution and warning were dismissed and ignored (see 
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also Godechot 2007). Finance corporations disregard, isolate and boot out those expressing 
dissenting views. Thus Rajan (2010: 141) cites investment bankers according to whom 
management risk managers concerned about highly leveraged lending practices had been 
‘”fired long ago’”; while Augar (2009: 164) recalls the ‘iron grip’ of Adam Applegarth, then 
Chief Executive of Northern Rock. Applegarth’s expansionist business strategy brought about 
the death of a bank that only a few years earlier had been a sedate building society owned by 
its customers and members. Martin (2013) portrays another former bank Chief Executive 
Officer, Fred Goodwin, as someone whose attention to corporate representation and 
commercial imperial ambitions overstretched and eventually brought on the collapse of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). Goodwin’s behaviour has been likened to a psychopathic 
disorder not atypical for senior corporate management (Kets de Vries 2012). In influential 
positions, people with these traits become ’seductive operational bullies’ (or ‘SOB’, ibid.) who 
instil fear and quell any prospect of an alternative business or behavioural model. 
There is little systematic knowledge of what attracts such risk-takers or corporate 
bullies into financial services occupations. Much research on job choices has focussed on 
comparisons of private and public sector preferences and selections (e.g. Smith & Cowley 
2011, Buelens & Van den Broeck 2007). Factors such as pay, responsibility, self-development, 
job autonomy are known to affect these choices. A survey of finance professionals in the City 
of London, however, found that salary and bonuses were the main attractions for 
professionals working in the financial sector (St Paul’s Institute 2011).  
Not all authors who examined the roots of the GFC hold the view that uncontrolled, 
irresponsible individual behaviour was to blame for the crisis. Rajan (2010: 121) notes that 
business people’s ‘willingness to exploit any advantages that will help them make money… 
stems partly from the nature of competitive banking…and partly from the way banker 
performance is measured’. Similarly, Tett (2009: x) argues that ‘(t)he story of the great credit 
boom and bust is not a saga that can be neatly blamed on a few greedy or evil individuals’. 
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The real issue was ‘the finance world’s lack of interest in wider social matters’ (Tett 2009: 
298), its misguided belief in the infallibility of mathematical models (ibid: 299), a lack of top 
managerial control over traders (ibid: 156) and the disregard that investment traders paid to 
their management colleagues (ibid: 186) who were ultimately responsible for internal risk 
management. 
Structural explanations 
Tett’s and Rajan’s conclusions are echoed in the international literature on the structural 
causes of banking crisis. Here low interest rates and libertarian economic policy (Augar 2009, 
Cooper 2008) fuelled speculators’ ‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller 2000). They created artificial 
consumer markets (Demyanyk & Van Hemert 2008) facilitated by a patchy understanding of 
new financial products (Barnett-Hall 2009). In Britain, efforts by the Labour Party to attract 
the traditionally conservative corporate world of finance into its political realm saw it promote 
consumerism and public service marketization (Lee 2007, Taylor-Gooby 2008), and soft-touch, 
arms-length regulation of the financial sector. The socially destructive side effects of growing 
inequality were often ignored or tolerated (Picketty 2013, Wilkinson & Pickett 2009), while 
public opinion increasingly turned away from supporting the redistribution of wealth 
(Georgiadis & Manning 2007). The ‘triumph of the city’ (Lee 2007: 88), however, could not 
prevent the return of economic bust. Danger signs were spotted early, as, for instance, in 
Munro et al (2005). This study highlighted the risks of subprime lending to housing in the UK. 
Remarkably, its warnings appear to have been barely noted at the time.  
In the United States, subprime mortgaging had been driven by misleading, if not 
falsified information provided by mortgage sellers to home buyers about asset values (Piskorki 
et al 2013). These lending practices exposed banks to assets of questionable, indeterminable 
value, whilst these same banks lacked the assets to balance the risk of financial loss. Credit 
rating agencies did little to alert banks or the public to the rapidly growing risk of ‘progressive 
illiquidity’ of a financial system increasingly reliant on imaginary finance and speculation 
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(Nesvetailova 2008). That soft-touch regulation played a significant part in allowing this to 
happen would not have gone unnoticed by the authorities in charge. Already in 2004, research 
by the UK’s Financial Services Authority had found that regulatory requirements affected the 
amount of capital held by banks and building societies (Alfon et al 2004). As this regulatory 
influence vaned, so did the amount of ‘real’ money retained by the speculating banks.  
Making a connection 
Individualist and structural explanations for the crisis are not mutually exclusive and can be 
used to inform each other. Individual misdemeanour or corporate malfeasance, for instance, 
are easily condoned when they are alleged to be the result of some inescapable, if 
inconvenient, competitive or regulatory force. Disregarding rules then becomes institutionally 
permissible as illustrated in a review of conditions at Barclay’s Bank in the wake and aftermath 
of the Libor scandal (Salz 2013). It found that, after two decades of corporate growth, the bank 
had ‘no common purpose’ and no ‘shared values’ (Salz 2013: 6-7), and demonstrated a lack of 
corporate leadership. A lack of corporate oversight had allowed investment traders’ ‘animal 
instincts’ to take charge, encouraged by their generous financial rewards, which ‘contributed 
significantly to a sense among a few that they were somehow unaffected by the ordinary 
rules’ (Salz 2013: 9). With hindsight, the influence of both organisational structure and 
individual agency in the construction of the banking crisis appeared obvious. 
The question of the role of bonus payments in the GFC has recently moved off the 
political and public agenda, despite evidence that they did much to distort the lending market 
in the run up to the GFC. Agarwal and Wang (2009), for instance, found that incentive 
packages increased small business loan approvals by an unnamed major commercial bank by 
47 per cent and, tragically, the default rate by 24 per cent. In London’s financial district, as 
already noted, salaries and bonuses were the most important motivation for professionals 
working in financial services (St Paul’s Institute 2011). 
7 
 
Vested interests also shaped the political response to the GFC in the UK as 
Government commissions charged with reviewing the banking sector in the wake of the crisis 
were headed by individuals with close connections to the financial sector (CRESC 2009). 
Independent voices, in particular of those critical of the business and political elite, appeared 
excluded (Froud et al. 2011). This ‘democratic disconnect’ (ibid.) may well have served to 
protect the financial sector, as the thus generated exclusivity by virtue of exclusion 
perpetuated difference that eventually consolidated the status quo (Khan 2012).  
The present study lends some support to the plausibility of this thesis as it highlights 
a marked dissonance between the social perceptions of those working in managerial or 
investment positions in the financial services, whose voices have been most clearly heard and 
listened to before and after the onset of the GFC, compared with those in other occupations 
and sectors. 
Data sources and preparation 
The study used data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a longitudinal survey of 
households in Britain (and more recently also including Northern Ireland) that commenced in 
1991 and continues to the present day with an increased sample and now known as 
‘Understanding Society’. The BHPS covers about 5,000 households and some 10,000 
individuals, recording household characteristics and changes, labour market experiences, a 
broad range of social and social justice attitudes, including risk perceptions, and voting 
preferences and behaviours. It also gathers information on occupations, income and earnings, 
and bonus payments. 
The BHPS sample has been updated since its inception to allow for attrition and 
households entering or leaving the panel. Longitudinal and cross-sectional weights are 
available to enhance the representativeness of the datasets for the UK population.  
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In the longitudinal analysis of the BHPS, the study focuses on the period from 2001 to 
2008. This was for a number of reasons. First, 2008 was the natural end point for this analysis, 
as it signalled the final, full-blown arrival of the GFC and the recognition that this crisis 
required intensive state and banking sector crisis management. Second, 2001 was selected as 
the start date because by that year, the global economy had begun to cast aside, if not 
repaired, the damage caused by the previous crisis, namely the bursting of the dotcom bubble 
in 1999/2000 (e.g. Lowenstein 2004), starting a new economic cycle. Third, the selection 
needed to ensure appropriate survey questions were available for analysis. Each year, the 
BHPS includes different sets of attitudinal questions, which were repeated at different 
intervals, thus allowing the analysis of responses over time. Finally, the selection of the 
observation period was informed by the need to ensure a sufficiently large sample after 
allowing for attrition and non-responses. Small case numbers inevitably affected the detail of 
the analyses. However, validation checks, including the use of different analysis methods and 
changes to the samples that were studied, produce very similar results, confirming the 
robustness of the main findings that are reported here.  
Case identification 
The BHPS data include variables identifying current and past occupations of panel members.  
For the present study, we used the UK Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 1990 for 
data pertaining to the year 2001 to identify those working in the financial services sector. For 
later years, the UK SOC 2000 was used. Every effort was made to match sub-major and major 
level categories, drawing on ONS (2000) and ONS (2006).  
The case identification distinguished between two main groups of FSE, who, for ease 
and brevity of description will be referred to as investment and management (or managerial) 
employees. Investment FSE were drawn from the SOC unit group of Business and Finance 
Associate Professionals (353) and included brokers (SOC 2000 minor group: 3532), insurance 
underwriters (3533), finance and investment analysts/advisers (3534), and business and 
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related associate professionals n.e.c. (3539). Managerial FSE were identified in the two SOC 
2000 unit group of functional manager (113) and financial institutions and office managers 
(115). From the former occupation, we included financial managers and chartered secretaries 
(1131); from the latter, financial institution managers (1151).   
Bonus payment 
Since 1997 (wave G), the BHPS has recorded whether, in the previous 12 months, respondents 
had ‘received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit 
sharing bonus, or an occasional commission’. Those who had were then asked about the total 
amount of bonus payments received during that period, and whether the amount was before 
or after tax. Each year, around 90 per cent of those who had indicated they had received a 
bonus payment also provided the amount. In combination with earnings data also reported in 
the BHPS, this information was used to estimate the share of bonus payments as of total 
earnings. All monetary values used in this study were inflated to 2008 GB Pounds using CPI 
data. 
Attitudes and Opinions 
The BHPS contains a range of social and political attitude questions that survey respondents 
have been asked in different waves. Most of these questions have been included in several, 
but not consecutive waves of the BHPS. The sole notable exception are questions on voting 
behaviour, which had been included in all waves.  
The present study focussed on a sub-set of recently asked questions that allowed 
testing for socio-cultural differences between FSE and other sections of the working 
population. It analysed responses to questions eliciting attitudes towards money and risk 
taking; about social trust and social justice. The measures pertaining to social justice allowed 
respondents to express agreement or disagreement with a range of statements often 
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fundamental to underlying social and economic beliefs, including in the efficiency and 
equitable nature of the market economy, and its effectiveness in sharing outputs.  
The exact wording of the questions and associated answer options was as follows: 
The importance of money 
 ‘I'm going to read you a list of things that different people value. For each one I'd like 
you to tell me on a scale from 1 to 10 how important each one is to you, where ‘1' 
equals ‘Not important at all' and '10' equals ‘Very important'.’ 
o ‘Having a lot of money’ 
Risk taking 
 ‘Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks? 
Response options on scale 1-10, where  
o 1 = ‘Unwilling to take risks’  
o 10=‘Fully prepared to take risks’ 
Trust 
 ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't 
be too careful in dealing with people?’ 
o ‘Most people can be trusted’  
o ‘Can’t be too careful ‘ 
o ‘Depends’ 
Social Justice and Preferences 
 ‘People have different views about society. I'm going to read out some things people 
have said about the UK today and I'd like you to tell me which answer off the card 
comes closest to how you feel about each statement.’ 
Response options on scale 1-5, where  
o 1 = ‘Strongly agree’ and 
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o 5 = ‘Strongly disagree’ 
The statements were: 
o ‘Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth’  
o ‘There is one law for the rich and one for the poor’ 
o ‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve the UK's economic problems’ 
o ‘Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’ 
o ‘It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants 
one’ 
o ‘Strong trade unions are needed to protect the working conditions and wages 
of employees’ 
 
The questions on money and trust were covered in the BHPS in 1998, 2003 and 2008, 
whereas those on social justice attitudes and preferences were asked in 2000, 2004 and in 
2007. The risk question, on the other hand, had been included in the BHPS for the first time 
in 2008. 
Profiling financial services employees 
This section starts with a description of the socio-demographic characteristics of those 
working in higher level financial occupations in the UK based on BHPS data for 2008. This is 
followed by summaries of the findings from statistical tests of differences in social attitudes 
among employees in financial service occupations and others in the workforce. Using 
multivariate regression, the analyses controlled for a range of socio-demographic and other 
characteristics that are explained below.  
All analyses focussed on individuals in employment at the expense of those 
temporarily or permanently outside the labour market. This helped the study to focus on 
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examining the influence of continuous employment with an organisation on socio-cultural 
values. Unless otherwise indicated, only statistically significant results are reported. 
Socio-Demographics 
For the analysis of socio-demographics, we used cross-sectional data from the 2008 BHPS. In 
that year, investment and management FSE each accounted for about 1.2 per cent of 
employees in employment in that year. 1 In both FSE groups only about half were employed 
in the financial services sector (45 per cent), while almost a quarter was working in production 
(23 per cent), one fifth in private services other than the financial sector (19 per cent) and the 
remainder was employed in public services (13 per cent).   
Employees in financial services occupations differed from others in employment on a 
range of characteristics. Although there were no statistically significant differences in the 
mean ages, FSE tended to concentrate in the two lower age categories of those aged 26-35 or 
aged 36-45 (Table 1). FSE were more likely to be married and to have at least undergraduate 
qualifications. On average, they had spent fewer years (3.9) with their current employer than 
others had (5). They were more likely to have received a bonus payment in the previous 12 
months, and these bonus payments tended to be significantly higher in that year and but also 
when summed over the previous five years (2003-2008). FSE had received bonus payments 
more often during that period than others had. FSE were also more likely to be living in London 
and England’s South-East. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Within the group of FSE, that is, comparing investment and management FSE, there 
were fewer statistically significant socio-demographic differences, although small case 
numbers may have disguised some of them. The main difference between the two groups was 
the lower average age of investment FSE (38 years, compared to 43 years) who included a 
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greater proportion of employees under the age of 26. Investment FSE were also less likely to 
be married.  
Although investment FSE had, on average, received bonus payments less frequently 
than managerial FSE, this barely dented their bonus income. When compared with their 
management peers, investment FSE had received higher bonus payment over the last five 
years as well as the previous year alone. The top bonus payment received by an investment 
FSE amounted to £125,000; that of a management FSE came to an average of £107,500. The 
highest single bonus payment in 2008 amounting to £200,000, however, had been paid to 
someone not in a financial services occupation.  
These statistics again demonstrate this study’s concern not with top bonus earners in 
financial occupations whose reported bonus income can equate to several multiples of the 
amounts reported here. Instead, the study is concerned with the occupational average. The 
probability that the elite of very high-bonus earning FSE would be captured in a social survey 
is very small indeed. This said, the study identified a distinct group of high earners in finance 
whose income would have ranked them in the top percentile of all earners in the UK at the 
time. 
Attitudes and Opinions 
Whilst FSE were, on average, higher earners, their attitudes to money or risk were not 
dissimilar to those of the rest of the working population. For instance, 27 per cent of FSE and 
31 per cent of others in employment and interviewed in 2008 considered it important to have 
money (measured as rated 8 or higher on the 10-point scale) (Table 2). Similarly, 20 per cent 
of FSE and 18 per cent of others in employment considered themselves willing to take risks 
(rated 8 or higher). In neither case were the nominal differences statistically significant.   
 




In contrast, FSE were more likely than others to express trust. 2 More than half of FSE 
thought that ‘most people can be trusted’, compared with only a third of other people in 
employment. Further differences emerged with respect to socio-political and socio-economic 
orientations recorded by the BHPS in 2007. These suggested a greater prevalence of support 
for private capital over public intervention among FSE when compared with other employees. 
Thus, FSE were more likely than others to agree that ‘ordinary people get a fair share 
of the nation’s wealth’ (27 per cent versus 14 per cent) and that ‘private enterprise is the best 
way to solve the UK’s economic problems’ (40 per cent; 18 per cent). FSE thus indicated a 
stronger than otherwise typical belief in the fairness of the current economic system and a 
preference for market-based approach to economic development. The latter was also 
reflected in FSE’s lower propensity to support the view that public services should be state 
owned (30 per cent; 34 per cent), or that government had an obligation to provide jobs (24 
per cent; 38 per cent). Conversely, FSE were less likely to believe that ‘there was one law for 
the rich, and one for the poor’ (37 per cent; 58 per cent), suggesting a stronger belief in the 
fairness of the current system of legal and social justice.  
Differences were also again apparent between the opinions of investment and 
management FSE. Here, management FSE more frequently expressed non-interventionist, 
pro-market values than their investment FSE peers. They were more likely to agree with the 
statement that private enterprise would solve the UK’s economic problem (53 per cent versus 
28 per cent), but less convinced that the government should be expected to provide jobs for 
people 15 per cent; 33 per cent). They were also less likely to believe that trade unions 
protected working conditions and wages (45 per cent; 63 per cent).  
Cross-sectional logistic regression 
These relationships or lack thereof also held after controlling for socio-demographic and 
employment characteristics. Cross-sectional logistical regression analyses, which, for space 
reasons, cannot be described in detail here, highlighted sex and age as key factors associated 
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with most attitudes and perceptions examined here. Furthermore, whereas no independent 
statistical relationships were found between FSE status and the importance attached to 
money or to self-perceptions as risk takers, trust and social justice perceptions remained 
independently associated with FSE status.  
Social attitudes, self-selection and employment 
Having established that FSE expressed social values and preferences that were different from 
those of other employees, we are left with exploring how these orientations relate to 
employment in financial services occupations or the financial services sector. The remainder 
of the paper examines whether people with the given attitudes were particularly likely to be 
working and especially likely to choose to be working in these occupations or sector, or 
whether working in these occupations or sector made it more likely that someone adopted 
these values and perceptions over time. To do so, a series of panel data analyses were 
conducted, focussing on FSE’s assessment of economic fairness and of private enterprise as 
those most distinctively shared by FSE. Panel analysis made it possible to study the dynamics 
of these social attitudes and, in this instance, employment in financial services occupations 
since the previous economic and stock market crisis of the early 2000s.  
The analysis combined data for the years 2001, 2004 and 2007, generating over 
15,000 observations or data points available for analysis, including 337 pertaining to FSE. 
Multivariate random-effects probit models were run to estimate the effects of FSE status, 
employment and socio-demographic factors on respondents’ perceptions of economic 
fairness and their attitudes to private enterprise. Four new variables were added to the 
variable set used in the initial analyses in order to refine the estimations. These new variables 
captured the influence of earnings risk, earlier social attitudes, sectoral variations and newly 
entering a financial services occupation. 
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Bringing risk back in 
‘Risk’ was brought back in to control for variations in the ‘attraction’ that working in a specific 
occupation may present. Research by Bonin et al. (2007) and Pollmann (2011) had shown an 
association between attitudes to risk and occupational choices. The authors found that people 
with more positive attitudes towards risk taking tended to select into occupations with higher 
levels of wage dispersion, which they interpreted as an indication of a greater readiness to 
work in a volatile and potentially insecure job environment. Introducing earnings risk thus 
helped to control for self-selection into these types of occupations, which may have been 
driven by a tolerance, acceptance or indeed expectation of risk – and commensurate reward. 
Above all, the earnings dispersion variable helped to control for differences between 
occupations, which, on the basis of the above literature, should exert a matching pull on 
employment seekers with similar risk orientations and associated expectation from their job. 
Following the above authors, a basic Mincer regression3 (Mincer 1974) of the 
occupation-specific variance of earnings residuals was estimated in order to capture this 
volatility and, if indirectly, occupational risk. The resulting data were coded into a variable that 
identified occupations whose variance of the earnings residual was below, within or above 
one standard deviation of the mean of all occupations’ residuals. It turned out that the 
earnings dispersion in the financial services occupations typically ranged within one standard 
deviation of the residual means, whilst about 10 per cent of employees had selected into 
occupations one standard deviation below the residual mean and a further 10 per cent had 
selected into occupations one standard deviation above the residual mean. 
Time lag 
A lag of the outcome variable of interest was introduced to account for the fact that past 
status is known to shape current status in most observed social phenomena. Introducing 
lagged variable meant that analyses drew other explanatory variable from just the last two 
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occasions that they were observed. This resulted in a shrinking of the total number of data 
points to just under 13,000.  
Highlighting the sector 
Whilst our analyses so far focussed on FSE, as already noted, only about half of them were 
employed in the financial services sector. As this study was also and specifically concerned 
with identifying social orientations in the UK banking sector, a further variable was added to 
mark respondents’ industrial sector of employment.  
Identifying FSE entrants 
A further new variable identified individuals in the samples who were working in a financial 
services occupation in one of the survey waves when the relevant attitude questions were 
asked (e.g. 2007), but not in any of the previous ones when these questions had also been 
asked (i.e. 2004 and 2001). This variable therefore identified those who entered a financial 
occupation during the period covered by the analysis.   
The time lag and sector variables, and the new entrant identifier were added 
sequentially to the probit model, which initially only included socio-demographic variables 
and the Mincer occupational risk indicator. 
Findings I – economic fairness  
The analysis of the economic fairness statement that ‘ordinary people get their fair share of 
the nation’s wealth’ confirmed a strong association with sex, age and years spent with current 
employer (Table III, Model 1). All else equal, women were less likely than men to agree with 
that statement. Agreement with the statement also decreased with age, but increased with 
the time spent working with the same employer. In addition, variations in earnings dispersal 
were associated with perceptions of economic fairness. In comparison to people in 
occupations with below average wage dispersion, those in occupations with above average 
wage dispersion were more likely to agree with the statement. After taken these factors into 
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account, employees not in financial services occupations were less likely than FSE to agree 
that the current system of wealth sharing was fair. Put another way, people in financial 
services occupations were more likely to believe that economic wealth was shared fairly in UK 
society.  
 
<Table 3 about here>  
 
The introduction of the lagged outcome variable and the industrial sector rendered 
the earnings dispersal indicator statistically non-significant, whilst reducing the level of 
significance of the occupation variable (Model 2). As expected, the lagged outcome variable 
was strongly positively associated with the current outcome variable, whilst the industrial 
sector variables revealed a greater propensity of those working in the financial sector to share 
a belief in the fairness of the UK socio-economic system.   
As shown in Model 3 of Table 3, there was no difference with respect to perceptions 
of fairness between recent entrants to financial services occupations and other employees. 
Selection into financial services occupations therefore appeared not to be affected by a priori 
beliefs in the fairness of the UK’s economic systems. Instead, socio-demographic 
characteristics and years spent with the same employer predominantly shaped and 
consolidated this fairness perception, although additional, if weaker, unexplained 
independent occupational and sectoral effects remained. 
Findings II – attitudes to private enterprise 
Similar associations involving socio-demographic, occupational and sectoral indicators were 
found for attitudes towards private enterprise. Model 1 again highlighted statistically 
significant differences with respect to sex and age, but lesser associations with years spent 
with employer (Table 4). Women and those with more years with the same employer were 




<Table 4 about here> 
  
The receipt of a bonus payment in the previous 12 months was also inversely 
associated with agreement with the enterprise statement, as was wage dispersion although 
the statistical significance of that association was just outside the 5 per cent level. After taking 
these variables into account, management FSE were more and other employees less likely to 
agree with the enterprise statement than investment FSE were. 
The addition of the lagged outcome variable and the industry sector variable in Model 
2 lessened the statistical strength of the observed difference between occupations, whilst 
rendering bonus payment and wage dispersal non-significant. As before, the lagged outcomes 
variable was strongly positively associated with the current outcome variable.  Employees in 
private and financial services were more likely than others to express confidence in private 
enterprise’s capability to solve the UK’s economic problems.    
Adding the new entrant indicator into Model 3 had few effects on already observed 
statistical relationships, although it accentuated the prevalence of pro-enterprise attitudes 
among FSE compared with employees in other occupations. The statistical coefficient 
pertaining to the new entrant variable itself indicated a fairly strong, but inverse relationship 
between pro-enterprise perceptions and the entry into a financial services occupation. In 
other words, selection into financial services occupations was not driven by pro-enterprise 
preferences; if anything, the reverse was true. Instead, the articulation of these preferences 
was primarily a reflection of employment in the private sector and, in particular, as managerial 
FSE. Pro-enterprise perceptions did not become more prevalent with time spent with the 
same employer.  
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Discussion and conclusions 
To summarise, the analyses confirmed that, in the run-up to the GFC, employees in financial 
services occupations and those working in the financial services sector were more inclined to 
express attitudes indicative of supporting current features of socio-economic justice and 
dominant economic principles in the UK than employees in other occupations. This was 
particularly apparent with respect to support for the economic fairness thesis. The association 
between FSE status and social attitudes was weaker with respect to orientations towards 
private enterprise, where the attitudinal divide cut across employment in production and 
public administration, on the one hand, and employment in services, including financial 
services, on the other hand.   
Sharing these social attitudes was not necessarily associated with selection into 
financial occupations or the finance sector. The most consistent evidence pointed at 
employment duration or exposure to financial occupations and, more broadly, private 
services affecting employees’ perceptions of economic fairness and the capacity of private 
enterprise to redress economic problems. In other words, institutionally-induced 
acculturation may be a more appropriate explanation for the prevalence among FSE of the 
perceptions examined here than pre-existing social preferences, in particular with respect to 
perceptions of economic fairness.  
The evidence thus lends strongest support to the institutional-structural rather than 
the individual-behaviourist model of analysis. This conclusion complements the findings of 
Cohn, Fehr and Marechal’s (2014) laboratory experiment, which showed that only when 
reminded of their professional status did bankers display dishonest behaviours in the game-
based experiment, whereas employees from other industries did not.  
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Social attitudes and the GFC: a case of tunnel vision? 
When Toynbee and Walker (2008) spoke with London law partners and merchant bankers 
about the economics of effort and reward in high paying professions, they encountered 
blinkered perceptions of socio-economic privilege, a strong individualistic and conservative 
attitudes, and strongly articulated status defence. Their findings were published soon after 
Orton (2006) had reported on the reluctance of wealthy individuals interviewed in the English 
Midlands to embrace active (local) citizenship as a practice fostering reciprocity and social 
cohesion, and Cowling and Harding’s (2007) survey-based study that had found high income 
earners most inclined to accept social inequality. More recently, studies in psychology have 
found further evidence of a generic relationship between social class and (a lack of) generosity 
(Piff et al. 2010)  and (a propensity to display un-) ethical behaviour (Piff et al. 2012). This 
evidence strongly points towards perceptual and behavioural class divides that, among those 
most privileged, undermine access to critical reflexivity that would have been required for a 
person to recognise their potential or actual role in the construction of the GFC.  
In a similar vein, the present study has demonstrated that management FSE were 
particularly likely to express pro-enterprise attitudes, especially if they worked in the financial 
services sector. The importance of this finding is hard to underestimate given the role of 
management FSE in the GFC as the key decision-takers in corporate leadership positions. 
Investment FSE may have driven profit, in the process bypassing the business’s risk managers 
(Godechot 2007, Ho 2009), but the buck of due diligence and corporate strategy typically stops 
with those in managerial positions. The current analysis will not have picked up the views of 
the very top-level managers, but its findings hint at an ‘organic’ presence of orientations 
across FSE occupations, cultivated in and permeating the finance sector that would have 
propelled managers towards seeking crisis solutions within – and not: challenging - the status 
quo.   
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This permeation of pro-market orientations in finance has implications for UK public 
policy because of the way in which politics has handled the financial sector and the crisis. The 
point to stress is the politically significant role that the financial sector played in UK politics 
and its elevated (some would say: inflated) status in the economy. Its status as the UK’s 
principal global industry, promoted by the state, protected from the state’s intervention and 
largely left to its own devices, meant it remained an autonomy unrivalled in the British 
economy (see the chapter on the City of London Corporation in Shaxson 2011).  
Tying public policy to vested interests and ideologies bears risks. The St Paul’s Institute 
(2011) study cited earlier described how financial services professionals often lacked historical 
memory: most were not aware of earlier recessions in the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Some even lacked specialist knowledge: one in five finance professionals incorrectly believed 
that the UK was in recession in 2007. A lack of historical memory leaves one prone to ignoring 
or denying the need for reform, while a gap in basic professional expertise is hardly 
encouraging.  
What to do? 
Financial systems allowed to roam free in capitalism distort realities to suit their own agendas 
and prosperity.  They “overvalue opportunities and underestimate risks in an effort to cope 
with the need to fulfil the expectation upon them” (Tuckett 2009: 3). To do so, finance relies 
on often inadequate mathematical (computer) models (Barnett-Hart 2009) and introvert 
evaluation cultures (Mackenzie 2011), whilst banking institutions construct environments to 
accelerate trading, grow profit, and make markets (MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu 2008) on the 
pretence of knowing what cannot be known (Power 2004; cited in Pryke 2010).  
Financialisation and its tools, and the rewarding of high-leverage risk taking 
(Lapavitsas 2011, Bebchuk & Sparmann 2009) have created dependencies, which make reform 
built on a voluntary (moral) readjustment of the sector seem unlikely and insufficient 
(Graafland & van de Ven 2011). The complexities of the foundations, causes and drivers of the 
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GFC have been perplexing, but they also offer anchors for inducing change. The argument 
made here is that reform must start with the organisation; the evidence locates the ‘problem’ 
within the institutional structures embedded in mainstream financial and economic markets 
(not discounting Kets de Vries’s [2012: 8] ‘SOB’).  
Changing structures and the actions they promote or facilitate provides formidable 
challenges.  The data have shown that private enterprise creates its own allegiance: those 
who work in the private sector support private sector solutions. Here, the banking sector 
resembles any other private sector, although management FSE are additionally prone to 
expressing pro-enterprise views. With respect to economic fairness, the financial sector 
stands out on its own in supporting (its perception of) the status quo. Devising a strategy that 
might help to change these attitudes and actions that may result from them is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Some seemingly ‘obvious’ and frequently proposed solutions, such as 
capping bonuses, may not work: the present analysis revealed little direct association 
between being paid bonuses and socio-political attitudes, although indirect effects, for 
instance via bonus-induced longer job tenure, cannot be ruled out. 
While the scope for changing the social and political attitudes and corresponding 
actions that corporate banking appears to inculcate requires further study, resources ought 
also to be invested in containing the damaging influence of financial markets on society. This 
means, implementing some of the long-debated structural reforms that address the markets’ 
exclusivist operational principles and corporate identities, working at various fronts.  
In order to begin to dismantle the disproportionate influence of financial markets and 
their failures, bank activities would need to be isolated and refocussed. Banking, as has 
repeatedly been said, may again need to be ‘boring’, - or ‘narrow’ (Kay 2009). Splitting 
investment from retail bank may be one first step. However, banks ought also to be reformed 
internally, with backroom staff and human resource departments being given greater control 
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and supervisory responsibility to ensure accountability at all levels of the business. Reform 
needs to redress the influence of both investment and management FSE.  
The question of the political influence of finance also needs to be addressed. 
Rebalancing economies from ‘socially useless’ (Turner 2009) to production that is socially 
useful is one critical component of this process, which may need to be done with banks in the 
role of supportive lenders, not speculating investors.  
Notes 
1 CRESC (2009) estimated that about 6.5 per cent of the UK workforce was employed in finance, 
including jobs in consultancy, accounting and law associated with the financial sector.  Two per cent 
of investment FSE were self-employed.  There were no self-employed management FSE in the sample.  
2 Trust is typical for many investing in shares and can, for this reason, be expected to be a shared 
characteristic of investment FSE (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2007) 
3 To do so, we regressed the log of respondents’ income on the square and the cube of their time 
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Table 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Financial Service Employees (FSE) and Other Workers (in %, unless otherwise indicated) 










  A B A vs B C D C vs D 
Location London & SE England 33.0 32.1  32.6 24.9 ** 
        
Age Mean age 37.6 42.7  40.1 41.5  
 under 26 11.6 15.2  5.9 14.6 *** 
 26-35 34.7 57.9 ** 25.1 18.7 *** 
Marital status Married 49.7 76.5 *** 62.9 54.4 *** 
 Never married 38.9 22.2 ** 30.7 32.8  
Years with employer Less than 5 69.3 65.9  67.6 62.0  
 Mean years 3.4 4.4  3.9 5.3  
Highest qualification Postgraduate degree 6.2 13.9  10.1 3.7 *** 
 First degree 31.0 22.3  26.6 17.4 *** 
Received bonus in last 12 months  46.0 71.1 ** 58.3 27.0 *** 
Number of waves received bonus 
payment 
Mean 5.5 9.0  7.2 3.4  
Gross bonus before tax Mean £ 3831.4 8238.9  5998.3 847.9  
Gross bonus as % of usual monthly gross 
pay 
Mean % 12.3 14.1  13.4 9.5  
Total gross bonus before tax 2003-2008 Mean £ 14240.4 47832.4  30754.9 3673.8  
Gross bonus, net difference 2003 and 
2008 
Mean £ 12853.2 4330.5  6640.7 1483.0  
        
N  85 70  155 7020  
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01  
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Table 2. Attitudes and Opinions of Financial Service Employees (FSE) and Other Workers 












2008 (wave R)  A B A vs B C D C vs D 
Importance of money (1-10) Mean 6.5 6.5  6.6 6.6  
 Important (8-10) 29.9 23.7  26.8 30.5  
Generally takes risks (1-10) Mean 4.9 5.1  5.0 5.3  
 Risk taking (8-10) 23.0 17.2  20.2 18.4  
Trust (1-3) Mean 1.9 1.6  1.8 2.2  
 Most people can 
be trusted 
42.4 60.4 *** 51.5 33.2 *** 
 Depends 23.2 14.9  19.0 17.4  
 Can't be too 
careful 
34.4 24.7  29.5 49.4 *** 
N  49 45  94 3729  
        
2007 (Wave Q)        
Ordinary people share nations wealth (1-5) Agree (1-2) 24.7 28.9  26.7 13.7 *** 
 Mean 3.4 3.2  3.3 3.5  
Private enterprise solves economic 
problems (1-5) 
Agree (1-2) 27.8 53.2 ** 40.1 17.5 *** 
 Mean 3.0 2.5  2.8 3.1  
One law for rich and one for poor  Agree (1-2) 39.0 34.5  36.8 58.3 *** 
 Mean 2.9 3.1  3.0 2.5  
Public services ought to be state owned  Agree (1-2) 31.3 28.5  30.0 34.1  
 Mean 3.1 3.4  3.2 2.9  
N  53 44  97 3838  
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01  
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Table 3. Multivariate analysis results of agreement with statement ‘Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth’  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coef. Std.   Coef. Std.   Coef. Std.  
Sex (Female) -0.259 0.042 ***  -0.150 0.032 ***  -0.150 0.032 *** 
Location (London & South East) -0.069 0.058   0.010 0.042   0.010 0.042  
Age -0.010 0.002 ***  -0.008 0.001 ***  -0.008 0.001 *** 
Marital status (Divorced) -0.129 0.072 *  -0.103 0.056 *  -0.104 0.056 * 
Years with employer 0.010 0.003 ***  0.008 0.002 ***  0.008 0.002 *** 
Bonus payment in last 12 months (Yes) 0.001 0.039   0.035 0.035   0.035 0.035  
Wage dispersal (at least 1 SD below mean)            
Within 1 SD of mean 0.119 0.063 *  0.066 0.051   0.066 0.051  
more than 1 SD above mean 0.152 0.074 **  0.068 0.060   0.068 0.060  
Occupation (investment FSE)            
Management FSE -0.283 0.236   -0.122 0.181   -0.122 0.181  
Other employee -0.456 0.167 ***  -0.249 0.133 *  -0.262 0.159 * 
            
Lagged outcome variable (Ordinary)     0.898 0.038 ***  0.898 0.038 *** 
Industrial sector (Production)            
Public admin, education, health     0.028 0.036   0.028 0.036  
Services excl. financial, pub admin etc.     0.026 0.042   0.026 0.042  
Financial services     0.149 0.074 **  0.148 0.074 ** 
Entrants to FSE         -0.027 0.182  
            
Constant -0.497 0.194 ***  -0.592 0.153 ***  -0.5789 0.1761 *** 
N 17465    12823    12823   
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01  
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Table 4. Multivariate analysis results of agreement with statement ‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve the UK's economic problems’ 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coef. Std.   Coef. Std.   Coef. Std.  
Sex (Female) -0.876 0.049 ***  -0.437 0.032 ***  -0.436 0.032 *** 
Location (London & South East) 0.060 0.063   -0.022 0.042   -0.022 0.042  
Age 0.031 0.002 ***  0.012 0.001 ***  0.012 0.001 *** 
Marital status (Divorced) -0.117 0.074   -0.068 0.052   -0.068 0.052  
Year with employer -0.006 0.003 *  -0.002 0.002   -0.002 0.002  
Bonus payment in last 12 months (Yes) -0.157 0.040 ***  -0.097 0.033 ***  -0.097 0.033 *** 
Wage dispersal (at least 1 SD below mean)            
Within 1 SD of mean 0.116 0.062 *  0.076 0.048   0.075 0.048  
more than 1 SD above mean -0.144 0.077 *  -0.088 0.059   -0.088 0.059  
Occupation (investment FSE)            
Management FSE 0.498 0.240 **  0.305 0.175 *  0.310 0.177 * 
Other employee -0.391 0.177 **  -0.220 0.133 *  -0.401 0.156 *** 
            
Lagged outcome variable (Ordinary)     1.168 0.034 ***  1.169 0.034 *** 
Industrial sector (Production)            
Public admin, education, health     -0.004 0.036   -0.005 0.036  
Services excl. financial, pub admin etc.     0.140 0.041 ***  0.139 0.041 *** 
Financial services     0.152 0.074 **  0.139 0.074 ** 
Entrants to FSE         -0.386 0.178 ** 
            
Constant -1.056 0.207 ***  -0.843 0.151 ***  -0.662 0.172 *** 
N 17465    12823    12823   
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01 
